Kierkegaard's Ontology

This excerpt from Casey Spinks, Kierkegaard’s Ontology: The Faith to Be is published with permission from Bloomsbury Academic.

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What does Søren Kierkegaard mean when he claims that his entire authorship is concerned with becoming a Christian? Most acknowledge that Kierkegaard cares about becoming a Christian. But what does that mean, to become a Christian? What even is a Christian? But following this line of questioning will eventually lead to the most basic question: what is it to be—what is that, essentially, to be, anyway?

Now, going through the levels of questions this hastily might seem to be a mistake only Socrates or a speculative philosopher would make. But this study will try to show that these questions belong together in Kierkegaard’s authorship. For Kierkegaard, the matter of being-itself, being as such, being in and for itself, and that of Christianity, are one. Therefore, this study will be an ontological interpretation of Kierkegaard’s authorship, treating his work as a discourse on what it is to be.

What is Ontology?

But what is ontology? For the purposes of this study, I mean it as fundamental ontology, the study of being qua being. To borrow from Aristotle, fundamental ontology is that “science (ἐπιστήμη) which investigates (θεωρεῖ) being as being (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν) and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature.” It is a contemplation (the original meaning of theoria), purely for the sake of contemplation, of being, using only the criteria given by being-itself. Thus, fundamental ontology is the study of being as, and in, its own revealing itself as being itself.

Now, Thomas Aquinas claims being can be said in two ways: by indicating a being’s actus essendi, its “act of being”—that something is—or by “the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject”—saying what it is through conceptual reasoning. The former is being understood as existence or fact, the latter being as essence or form. Now, the mode of existence is more primary than the mode of essence. So, a fundamental ontology would be a study of the nature of that-being, existence.

But there’s an immediate difficulty: as soon as we try to describe what the that is, we have already transferred the that into the realm of the what—essence. But the goal is precisely to understand the primary nature of being as existence, and only as that, existence! At best, it seems, we can indicate that something is, but as soon as we try for a speculation or deduction beyond such a simple indication, we have already made a category mistake, moving from existence to essence.

Kierkegaard wrestles with this difficulty as well. But for now, it is enough to show that fundamental ontology, if it wants to be a science of being qua being, must primarily focus on the nature of being in its existence, or to use Thomas’ language, being as actus essendi. That is, fundamental ontology must be a rigorous, even narrow study of what it is to exist, of the nature of the that, but only as that is revealed in its own actuality, presence—or better, presencing.

What is Kierkegaard’s Ontology?

Given the sheer variety of Kierkegaard’s authorship, as well as the fact that he is not a systematic writer, there seems to be no prospects for a unified, fundamental ontology of the sort described above. But in fact, at the risk of foreclosing an entire book, a very quick answer to the question of Kierkegaard’s ontology is found in a couple of his journal entries. Both are worth quoting at length. The first:

Being-in-and-for-itself [Det I-og-for sig Værende]—and my task.

I take out the New Testament … and now ask: how do we humans and the human race now relate to the whole perception of life as contained in the New Testament; compared to this, has there not happened a whole qualitative change to the race and what it is to be human?

Indeed there has, nothing is easier to see.

What is this change? It is that being-in-and-for-itself, the unconditioned, has altogether gone out of life, “reasoning” [Forstanden] is put in its stead, such that being-in-and-for-itself, the unconditioned, has not just gone out, but it becomes ridiculous to humans…

Being-in-and-for-itself and reasoning relate inversely to each other, where the one is the other is not. When reasoning has wholly penetrated all relationships and everything, then being-in-and-for-itself will have totally gone out.

And that is about where we are. Everywhere reasoning: instead of an unconditional erotic love —reasonable marriage, instead of unconditioned obedience—obedience by virtue of reasons, instead of faith —knowledge of foundations, etc. etc. etc.

But the New Testament represents just being-in-and-for-itself, singularly and purely being-in-and-for-itself; now I ask: what will it mean that we continue to let on as if everything were alright with calling ourselves Christians according to the New Testament, when just that nerve of the New Testament, being-in-and-for-itself, has gone out of life?

…Here, I think, is where we are now. That the race shall go through reasoning into the unconditioned again is my faith. But truth shall be met where we are. (KJN 9: 35-36 / SKS 25: 38-40)

This entry was written some time in 1852, two years before Kierkegaard’s infamous attack on Christendom would begin. It is a strange entry: an apocalyptic, bitter mix of the most concrete complaints with the most abstract philosophical categories. And yet it does answer what Kierkegaard thinks it is to be, though only as a gloss of a much larger program, one which will take a book to appreciate.

To be—better, to be in-and-for-itself, being qua being—is represented singularly and purely by the New Testament. To learn what it is to be, we only must open the New Testament to discover “the whole perception of life” contained therein. To be is to be “unconditioned,” or is the unconditioned.

Now, “being-in-and-for-itself” is a rich term from Kierkegaard’s philosophical context. It is prominent in the language of German idealism and especially in the thought of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel uses it variously to designate the point at which reasoning [Verstand] has succeeded in mediating contradictions and overcoming false oppositions, and thus has achieved the synthetic identity of being and intellect [Vernunft].

For Hegel, being-in-and-for-itself is the achievement of absolute knowledge [Vernunft], the unconditioned conditioning of intellectual subjectivity, through which regulative concepts shall be normative for understanding reality from now on. But for Kierkegaard, being-in-and-for-itself is directly the opposite. “Being-in-and-for-itself and reasoning relate inversely to each other: where the one is the other is not.” Kierkegaard takes the “in-and-for-itself” quite literally: to be, and only to be, by itself, untouched by the mediation of “reasoning,” pure being.

But there is a problem. There already has been a decline, and being-in-and-for-itself seems to have totally gone out of life, disappeared from the human race. The unconditioned has been replaced “everywhere” by conditioning and “reasoning.” Instead of immediate flashes of erotic, passionate love—good marriages of good stock. Instead of immediate unconditional obedience to commands—obedience following a period of prudent deliberation. Instead of pure faith—apologetics spoken to oneself. Human beings have not only forgotten being, they seem to have lost the capacity to let being manifest itself in themselves. So completely has rationalization penetrated every aspect of reality.

Even so, there is a glimmer of hope. Being-in-and-for-itself may still be found, if only we take out the New Testament again. But what would taking out the New Testament do? Kierkegaard offers a positive appraisal in a later entry:

Being-in-and-for-itself—“Faith”

Is there a being-in-and-for-itself? Christianity says yes, I am just that.

How is it known now, whether one relates himself to the being-in-and-for-itself, a relation which then again must be in the unconditioned form?

It is known thus, that he, though suffering from the relation (so the relation is the suffering’s cause and ground), yet faithfully holds fast to this being-in-and-for-itself.

When one wants to relate himself to the being-in-and-for-itself—and also have the earthly [Jordiske], then that is an equivocation (KJN 9:82 / SKS 25:84).

This entry clarifies just how much Kierkegaard equates being-in-and-for-itself with Christianity: Christianity claims that “I am just” that—being, in and for itself. And to “being-in-and-for-itself” and “the unconditioned” Kierkegaard adds a third and unsurprising framework for understanding existence: “faith.” “Faith” is the relation between oneself and being-in-and-for-itself, an attunement to being. Christian faith, then, is not only being-in-and-for-itself but the way of relating oneself to being-in-and-for-itself. This relation is a “suffering,” one whose “cause and ground” is being-in-and-for-itself. Attunement to being brings suffering, but only in such suffering does one attune to being, which is Christianity.

These two entries together provide a concise, if abstract and formulaic, definition of Kierkegaard’s ontology, one which should already shed some light on the claim that the issue of being and Christianity are one. Being-in-and-for-itself is fragile, at least in Kierkegaard’s time (and in ours as well, if, we must begin by assuming, he has something to teach us). Being is capable of being lost, it has totally gone out of life, and “reasoning” has replaced it. But being-in-and-for-itself may be recovered, yet only by passing through reasoning back to “the unconditioned.” Both the means and the end of being—the unconditioned—are one: through unconditional faith, against reasoning, one relates, in suffering, to the unconditioned, and thus one achieves the unconditioned itself.

These journal entries show that when Kierkegaard emphasizes the central issue of becoming and being a Christian in his authorship, he is also emphasizing the issue of being-in-and-for-itself. This book, therefore, will explicate the task of becoming and being a Christian ontologically. And thereby, I hope to show Kierkegaard’s sense of what it is to be as such will come to light.

I will conclude by showing Kierkegaard’s relevance to contemporary contemplation and Christian ontology. Odd as it may seem, Kierkegaard’s own approach to ontology, which seems to “virtually cancel thinking,” as Theodor Adorno complained of him, will open a way towards a stance of genuine contemplation. I take that opening as the first step for any claim to good thinking. As some celebrate and some lament, the very theoria which philosophers had once cherished as the contemplation, even the loving celebration, of what is—and purely for the sake of itself—has since gotten instrumentalized into theory, mostly so we can learn what we need to know to do the things with the world that we want to do.

But Kierkegaard would have us look to the lilies and birds instead. And by doing so, we may learn to contemplate existence, perhaps even affirm it, beyond our all-too-human projects and projections. And all because of God, Who God is and what God has done, and is doing and speaking, in His Word.