Some friends are planning on studying the Theatetus together this Summer. This Platonic dialogue is devoted to answering the question, “What is knowledge?”
In a sort of intellectual anticipation of reading the dialogue again, I was thinking about knowledge, and possibile definitions of it, as I walked into Home Depot today.
Before tackling the big question itself, my goal right now is to answer the question, “What might knowledge be? What are all the possibilities?” Putting all of the possibilities on the table and neglecting none, no matter how unlikely, is a responsible way to begin a search. Then one can go through each possibility systematically and inquire after the thing itself, discarding those possibilities that do not survive the examination.
Here is what I’ve up with so far… can you add to it?
1. Knowledge is justified true belief… these three words are in vogue right now, though Edmund Gettier has thrown the proverbial wrench into the argument. Notwithstanding, the argument runs that: If a person has a sincere belief, and a belief that is true, and if they have some evidential justification for believing it, then they have knowledge.
2. Knowledge is perception… This definition of knowledge is enticing. Anything that is perceived by the mind or the senses of a person is known by that person, and is true for that person, though it may not be true for any other perceiver.
3. Knowledge is sight… This definition is related to #2., but (I think) different. It says that whatever is seen directly by the mind, whatever is “clearly and distinctly” seen, is known by that mind. The distinct identity of this possibility owes to the ambiguity in “perception,” which could mean, roughly, “sense perception,” or “mental perception,” or both.
4. Knowledge is intuition. What might the relationship between intuition and “mental sight” be? I don’t know, but it seems different in at least this way: when people talk about their intuitions they usually locate the experience in the heart or or the stomach, (“trust your gut”) rather than the brain or mind. If for no other reason than this it seems to deserve an identity as a distinct possibility.
5. Knowledge is what is sensed. Another popular stance. Empiricism. What I see, touch, taste, hear, and smell is what I know. Everything else, even conglomorate topics or “complex ideas” in Locke’s terminology, though it may be valid and useful in some way, is different from knowledge, strictly defined.
6. Knowledge is justified true belief, if and only if the evidence for the belief is built out of or at least can be traced back to sense experience. This is a variation of empericism that wants to restrict armchair speculation and empty talk of that which lies outside the possibility of knowledge, and yet account for things like mathematics by identifying the original conceptual “units” of knowledge with experience. Having established or received these bits of knowledge, it is then also possible to build greater or more complex byte of knowledge.
7. Knowledge is a state of being… I do not know enough about Warrant theory to say what the relationship is between well-functioning reasoning faculties and knowledge, but there seems to be a distinct possibile definition that says when a person is constituted in a certain way then they may be said to have knowledge, regardless of whether they are using their senses, rationally justifying their beliefs, “seeing” anything, intuiting anything etc.
8. This is where you come in… Can you add to this list of possible definitions of knowledge?
I’ll cut to the chase, and avoid the prolonged agony of Socrates’ dialectic. For Plato and Socrates, knowledge is true justified belief. The problem with this formulation is what constitutes “justified?” In antiquity, armchair speculation about what is our “essence” and what is our “particular” brought about the nonsense that Form prevails over Matter. Because Saint Paul liked this concept of the eternal Form, and similarly disliked the temporal Particular, he bought into Socrates’ epistemology and ontology of the Form, hook, line, and sinker. And, because Christianity became the religion of the Empire, the Pauline doctrine prevailed against that of the Epicureans, Cynics, Skeptics, and to a lesser degree, the Stoics, with whom Saint Augustine found favor.
For 2,000 years, such nonsense, e.g., the denial of the concrete senses and the apotheosis of the eternal Form, dominated Western thought in all manner. Not until Bacon and Descrates came along and upset the cart did Western Civilization start to progress, and unchained to Platonic metaphysics and epistemology, it discovered the universe as it actually is, not as one might conceptualize it to be.
The only Platonic holdover was the notion of “justified.” But unlike Plato’s insistence that only reason could “justify” anything, Bacon insisted on the senses could. The biggest difference came with Bacon’s further insistence that only “verification” of sensory experience counts. And with those two words, recast in Bacon’s lexicon, modern science was born. And the slavery to someone else’s metaphysic was finally liberated.
To my delight, Epicureanism was “born again,” and scientific materialism (aka, naturalism) became the modern creed.
Gay species, thanks for the comment.
You said, “I’ll cut to the chase, and avoid the prolonged agony of Socrates’ dialectic. ”
Funny, I’ve come to believe that the prolonged agony of Socrates’ dialectic is precisely “the chase.” If I had the truth I wouldn’t be chasing after it. But alas, ‘I still having found what I’m looking for,’ so I continue to chase.
You seem to have found a few things, which is cool. Can you indulge someone who’s still looking? I’ll be grateful. You say, “For Plato and Socrates, knowledge is true justified belief.” Can you produce a piece of evidence, however quick, for this proposition?
Keith,
(1) Not sure if you want to countenance the ‘skeptical’ definitions of knowledge, e.g., knowledge is a social construct, linguistic convention, etc. etc.
(2) Regarding the JTB account of knowledge, it’s not clear to me that the Theaetetus presents one. It seems that there is a difference between what is nowadays called “justification” and what Plato calls a “logos” (usually translated “account”).
Thanks, Burglar.
I’m not quite sure how to handle a ‘skeptical’ definition of knowledge. The tension is obvious. How can someone who doesn’t buy that knowledge is possible give a solid definition of what it might be? Or, for the more extreme skeptics, how can someone who doesn’t believe in knowledge give a definition, even a hypothetical definition, of it?
But I think that including something like what you are saying fits with this list. For instance:
“8. What seems to be knowledge is in reality but socio-linguistic constructs, created within communities, valid only for those communities, only as long as those communities continue to agree on them.”
Is that fair?
“(2) Regarding the JTB account of knowledge, it’s not clear to me that the Theaetetus presents one. It seems that there is a difference between what is nowadays called “justification” and what Plato calls a “logos” (usually translated “account”).”
This is similarly unclear to me. I’m hoping, though, that Gay Species is able to help us out along these lines.
“Logos” entails nothing transcendent or supernatural. Any effort to see it this way is due entirely to a Christian template. Logos is thought or reason, which admittedly is immaterial, but then that actually raises more questions for Christianity (than vice versa), because John claims “the word became flesh.” How could Logos become a particular?
“Knowledge” is a key point about which many have quarreled. Many people think their solipsistic opinion counts, when it’s literally useless. At least Plato got the tradition off right by insisting on “justified” belief. 2,000 years later, I’m stunned by how many people ignore that sweet distinction. People actually quarrel over “verification” and “falsification,” admittedly a distinction, but compared to those who use neither?
“Logos is thought or reason, which admittedly is immaterial, but then that actually raises more questions for Christianity (than vice versa), because John claims “the word became flesh.” How could Logos become a particular?”
Gay Species, I probably don’t understand your epistemology/metaphysics yet, but I thought from posts on Jon Rowe’s blog, as well as here, that you were a materialist. Yet you say in this comment that thought or reason is immaterial. I’m interested in how do you account for this immateriality?
Also, I think you have asked the great question that thoughtful Christians have been wondering since Jesus was here: what does it mean that “the Word became flesh?” We don’t see irrationality here, but mystery – the greatest one, in fact.
What I find a bit funny is that you are so convinced that Paul buys Platonism. It’s hard for me to find Christians who buy that line, including most Bible scholars at Biola. On my part, I think Paul was but indirectly informed of platonism through the connotations of Greek words that changed from Plato to Paul’s time including “logos” (=word) and “diakasoune” (=righteousness or justice). Anyway, I wanted to point out this interesting place of agreement.
Cheers!
Gay Species:
You seem to find it difficult to accept that something eternal became a particular. Plato seemed to say as much in the Republic, for if there was someone who could see the light of the Forms, how could he want to go down into the cave? The philosopher/king problem restates this … (how could a philosopher who dwells in perfection find any interest in running a particular kingdom?). For Plato to accept anything like this would be to accept a paradox that is higher than all mediation.
Paul does not hide this paradox. Quite to the contrary, he stands at the gates of heaven preaching Christ crucified (which is foolishness to the Greeks (esp. Plato)). Christianity is full of these paradoxes. One that you mentioned is how Abraham (the one who took his maid-servant) could become the father of faith. Or to restate it in a more personal way: How can God see someone like ME as righteous? Again, this is a paradox that defies all mediation … yet accepting this paradox in faith is the requirement.
I would be interested in hearing more about how you associate Paul with Plato. I could see some similarities … especially with the paradox of how virtue can be taught (cf. the Meno). The earlier / Socratic dialogues seem to end in aporea. Paul transfigures this throughout 1 Corinthians when he says that if anyone claims to know something, he does not know as he ought to (8:2). Socrates’ “eiron” (irony, pretending not to know) becomes full blown ‘I know nothing’ … a stumbling block to the gnostics who came soon after Paul.
“It is certain because it is impossible.”
-Tertullian (a church father not fond of Plato)
Then answered the LORD unto Job out of the whirlwind, and said, Gird up thy loins now like a man: I will demand of thee, and declare thou unto me.
Wilt thou also disannul my judgment? Wilt thou condemn me, that thou mayest be righteous? Hast thou an arm like God? Or canst thou thunder with a voice like him?
Deck thyself now with majesty and excellency: and array thyself with glory and beauty. Cast abroad the rage of thy wrath: and behold every one that is proud, and abase him. Look on every one that is proud, and bring him low: and tread down the wicked in their place. Hide them in the dust together: bind their faces in secret.
Then will I also confess unto thee that thine own right hand can save thee. (Job 40.6-14)
One of the most difficult challenges that God has is to abase proud men and women (that is, all of us) in a way that instructs, redeems, and yet, develops wise humility in us. God does not merely cut man down in a final exercise of strength. The triune God wanted man to hear his voice walking in the garden in the cool of the day,and for this cause, to as many as received his own beloved Son, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name.
We may talk of knowledge, seeking to understand of what it consists, and seeking to analyze it in whole and in part. It is an honor to search out a matter; but it is the glory of God to conceal a thing. Let us not limit our understanding, by making definitions of knowledge, that squeeze out consideration of the interactions between God and man (as they are given to us in His Word) and of what they tell us about knowledge and how we gain it. When we make analyses, we need them to be tools we use, to search out God’s Word more carefully, so that we may rightly divide the Word of truth; and we do not need them to be tools that hinder our understanding of the ways of the Almighty One, and that, instead, become our idols.
C. H. Spurgeon said, “It is my firm belief that everything in heaven, and earth and hell, will be seen to be, in the long run, part of the divine plan; yet never is God the author or the accomplice of sin . . . sin rests with man, wholly with man, and yet by some strange overruling force, Godlike and mysterious, like the existence of God, his supreme will is accomplished . . . to deny this truth because we cannot understand it, were to shut ourselves out of a great deal of important knowledge.” (Metropolitan Tabernacle Pulpit,vol. 16, p. 501.)
“Logos” entails nothing transcendent or supernatural. Any effort to see it this way is due entirely to a Christian template.”
Can you produce a piece of evidence, however quick, for this proposition?
I would be interested in hearing more about how you associate Paul with Plato. I could see some similarities … especially with the paradox of how virtue can be taught (cf. the Meno). The earlier / Socratic dialogues seem to end in aporea. Paul transfigures this throughout 1 Corinthians when he says that if anyone claims to know something, he does not know as he ought to (8:2).
Makelovehappen,I was vascinated by this passage, but I want to hearthe theme played out more fully. I, too am curious to hear, from you, or Gay Species, or others, how Paul and Plato can be compared and contrasted.
Paul transfigures this throughout 1 Corinthians when he says that if anyone claims to know something, he does not know as he ought to (8:2).
Why do we think that Not knowing is like unto “not knowing as we ought to“? “Not knowing as I ought to” is yet knowing.
The difference between knowing and not knowing is one of category. The difference between knowing as one ought to and knowing not as one ought to seems to be one of mode, or type of knowledge.
1.) One of the most difficult challenges that God has is to abase proud men and women (that is, all of us) in a way that instructs, redeems, and yet, develops wise humility in us. God does not merely cut man down in a final exercise of strength. The triune God wanted man to hear his voice walking in the garden in the cool of the day,and for this cause, to as many as received his own beloved Son, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name.
We may talk of knowledge, seeking to understand of what it consists, and seeking to analyze it in whole and in part.
2.) It is an honor to search out a matter; but it is the glory of God to conceal a thing.
3.) Let us not limit our understanding, by making definitions of knowledge, that squeeze out consideration of the interactions between God and man (as they are given to us in His Word) and of what they tell us about knowledge and how we gain it.
4.) When we make analyses, we need them to be tools we use, to search out God’s Word more carefully, so that we may rightly divide the Word of truth; and we do not need them to be tools that hinder our understanding of the ways of the Almighty One, and that, instead, become our idols.
Karen,
Thanks for your comment and welcome to Mere-O.
I’m trying to get clear on what you are saying. Let me know if I have it.
In summary, I’m hearing 4 things…
1. God humbles the proud.
2. It is the glory of God to conceal a thing.
3. We must define knowledge in a way that accounts for the interaction between God and man, as those interactions are described or provided in the Word of God.
4. We should use analysis for better understanding God’s word.
I have some questions about the above, but I want to make sure I have it so far what you are saying so I’m not responding to a misunderstanding.
Gay Species,
I’m not sure, but I think you misunderstood my intent in mentioning “logos.” I wasn’t trying to suggest that Plato thought there was something transcendent or supernatural about knowledge. (My apologies if what I wrote was misleading.) I was only pointing out that to my mind the formula of knowledge in the Theaetetus, which is logos + true belief, is not necessarily the same as what is nowadays meant by justified true belief. That is, our concept of justification might not be the same as Plato’s concept of logos, where “logos” indicates nothing more than “account,” whatever that might entail/imply.
Your comments about verification and falsification have got me thinking more about their relation to justification. Usually one hears something like “a sentence cannot be considered a candidate for knowledge unless it is verifiable.” In this kind of usage, I don’t think that justification and verification are in the same category. It seems to me that verificationists don’t hold that the justification for a sentence (statement, proposition, etc.) is its verifiability. Rather, the verifiability is a condition that must be satisfied before the sentence can even be considered as a candidate for something that can be either true or false. The justification for a verifiable sentence would be some kind of evidence in support of the truth of the (verifiable) evidence.
Another way to put this might be that a sentence that is not verifiable is (according to verificationists) not even false (or true). It’s not the sort of thing that could be true or false, and therefore to speak of its possible justification is (they would say) literal nonsense.
Does this fit with your understanding of the issues?
In the second paragraph of my post above, the last sentences should read as follows: The justification for a verifiable sentence would be some kind of evidence in support of the truth of the (verifiable) sentence.