Professed conservatives have long been at a disadvantage relative to their liberal and social democratic opponents and seem continually to lose ground to these ideologies claiming the progressive label. This is because the principles of liberalism and socialism are straightforward and generally revolve around a single factor to which other elements are subordinated. For the liberal, freedom of the individual must take precedence over other considerations in the ongoing political conversation and in setting public policy. For the socialist, economic equality comes first, and everything else must be made to follow. By contrast, conservatives are hard-pressed to come up with readily communicable firm principles transcending their particular social and cultural contexts. Even conservatives in a single country quarrel over what represents “true conservatism” and what constitutes false labeling. Yet that has never kept them from trying to fill in what perpetually threatens to become an empty category.

Into this ongoing debate American-Israeli political philosopher Yoram Hazony has contributed a substantial and winsome defence of Anglo-American conservatism in his new book, Conservatism: A Rediscovery (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 2022). For the author, conservatism is not just a political stance but a way of life which he associates with a particular “national” tradition rooted in British and American experience and which he has attempted to live out with his family and congregation, albeit in a different country. That he ends the book with this line is significant: “Conservatism begins at home.”

I personally found the book a delightful read. Few nonfiction books are likely to be page turners, but this one is. Despite its nearly 400 pages, Conservatism is difficult to put down once you’ve begun, so it’s best to set aside some time to do it justice. Indeed, virtually every page is brimming with wisdom rooted in the biblical tradition with which the author, an observant Jew, is familiar. He shows considerable insight into human relationships and the qualities needed to maintain them over the long term. In fleshing out his conservative vision, Hazony succeeds in making the rival liberal and Marxist worldviews look thin and remote from lived reality. Nevertheless, despite the book’s considerable strengths, I was not persuaded by his overall argument for two reasons that I will explain below.

Because conservatives are particularists opposed to the vaunted universalisms of liberalism, Hazony defends one brand of conservatism, namely, the Anglo-American tradition, as mediated by, among others, Sir John Fortescue, Richard Hooker, Sir Edward Coke, John Selden, Sir William Blackstone, and Edmund Burke, and, on this side of the pond, George Washington, John Jay, John Adams, and Alexander Hamilton. These figures are important to Hazony, because they represent a tradition of constitutionalism supportive of the unique and distinctive national identities of Great Britain and America. Up until the French Revolution this tradition did not bear the conservative label, acquiring it only after losing ground to liberalism and, eventually, Marxism. Hazony treats the history of this tradition in his first chapter, seeing it based on five principles: historical empiricism, nationalism, religion, limited executive power, and individual freedom.

Due to post-Second World War efforts to bring together libertarians and Burkean conservatives in a single “fusionist” anti-communist coalition, there is a persistent tendency to conflate conservatism per se with classical liberalism, with its exaggerated focus on individual freedom. Hazony argues against this confusion, instead identifying conservatism with that championed by the early American Federalists, such as Adams, Washington, and Hamilton. In my own analysis of conservatism in Political Visions and Illusions (2019), I note that it is difficult to find within it an obvious redemptive narrative similar to those animating liberalism, nationalism, democratism, and socialism. But in this second chapter, Hazony definitely tells a story—one that boasts its own heroes and villains and has, at least for a time, a happy ending. If the Federalists are the heroes, the Jeffersonian Republicans are the villains, defending the parochial localisms of the several states against a proper—I’m tempted to say righteous—effort to forge a unified nation on principles of the ancient British constitution and the English common law. Here, as in his earlier book, The Virtue of Nationalism, Hazony makes an Aristotelian, but scarcely incontestable, judgement concerning the optimal size of a political community, the nation being the virtuous mean between the vicious extremes of narrow local loyalties and excessively broad imperial rule which extinguishes freedom.

In the third chapter, Hazony sets forth the peculiar features of the conservative paradigm, observing that it revolves around such elements as empiricism, mutual loyalty, honour, and hierarchy, as embodied in such traditional institutions as “[l]anguage, religion, law, and . . . forms of government and economic activity” (142) passed down through generations by a triad of communities which he describes as families, tribes, and nations.

The focus on empiricism is significant because it marks the principal epistemological difference between conservatism and its ideological rivals, especially liberalism. While the latter deduces such abstract principles as the freedom and equality of all persons from a supposedly universal reason, conservatives draw on the experience of their own communities, deriving their governing principles inductively from their lived realities. Indeed, Hazony denies that reason speaks with a single voice such that those exercising it will necessarily come to the same conclusions. “When people reason freely about political and moral questions, they produce a profusion of varying and contradictory opinions, reaching no consensus at all” (146). Enlightenment liberals mistake their favored principles, which they neglect to notice have come to them as a heritage from their forebears, for the universal wisdom of mankind.

Hazony devotes chapter 4 to the place of religion, which liberalism relegates to the realm of private choice. Arguing that “[p]ublic religion has been a central pillar of Anglo-American conservatism through its entire history” (190), he believes that “what is not honored in public also tends not to be honored in private” (190). The public affirmation of God is needed to consolidate reverence for a single normative order by which we can distinguish right from wrong. An atheist is compelled by his (lack of) belief to establish “a local standard of what is true and right . . . and this standard coexists with countless other local standards of what is true and right” (194). Whereas Enlightenment rationalism attempts to construct and maintain a political order in which belief in God is unnecessary, the conservative recognizes that a robust monotheism is needed to underpin a single moral and legal order binding on everyone. In effect, there is little difference between the polytheist and the atheist: each individual in effect becomes “one god among many others” (194), elevating his own local standards of right and wrong to a position of supremacy, ready to impose them on others. Thus both atheism and polytheism tend historically towards imperial rule—something that contradicts Hazony’s vaunted nationalism. However, a belief in one God who upholds a single standard of morality for all people is uniquely supportive of his triad of family, tribe (or congregation, as he calls it here), and nation.

On this basis Hazony proceeds in chapter 5 to discuss the purposes of government, “as these are understood in the Anglo-American conservative tradition” (224). Consistent with his empiricism, Hazony deliberately avoids deducing norms for government transcending the experience of particular nations. Indeed, government’s “purposes must vary from one nation to the next, as nations strive to discover the principles most conducive to strengthening themselves against their rivals and securing the welfare of their members” (233). Accordingly, he cites the purposes of government as found in the preamble to the United States Constitution and in Burke’s account of the English constitution, expanding on these in the remainder of the chapter. Nevertheless, he manages to fasten onto several items, such as justice, that are likely to appear to many of us to be more general norms. Is it possible to speak of government in the absence of justice? Augustine was doubtful. But whereas “not all governments are concerned with these aims [viz., establishing justice and promoting the general welfare], they are found wherever a nation is blessed with rulers who are righteous and wise” (246). This sentence is revealing in that Hazony here seems implicitly to recognize norms valid beyond the anglosphere.

In chapter 6 Hazony recounts the transition in the United States from Christian democracy to liberal democracy, the latter term coming into favour by the end of the 20th century. Prior to the Second World War, Americans saw themselves living in a “God-fearing democracy” (264), but the post-war fusion of traditional conservatism and classical liberalism into a broad anti-communist coalition ended with the eclipse of the traditional religious component and the triumph of the freely choosing self.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Everson v Board of Education (1947) was the first sign that its jurisprudence would move to suppress the public manifestation of religion. A series of subsequent rulings, such as Engel v Vitale (1962) and Abington School District v Schempp (1963) prohibiting official prayers in public schools, furthered this trend, based on the conviction that one could be privately Christian and publicly liberal (308). Here Hazony surveys the thinking of several figures in the post-war “fusionist” movement, who, while united in their adherence to the American cause in the Cold War, ran the gamut from traditionalist Russell Kirk to liberal rationalist Frank Meyer. Because these figures submerged their differences so as to form a united front against communism, traditional conservatives arguably lost their ability to combat a powerful ideological vision based on a much less constrained form of liberalism.

Yet liberalism’s victory, which seemed complete by the 1960s and 70s, proved to be a temporary one. Despite the failure of one brand of Marxism at the turn of the final decade of the 20th century, three decades later it had returned in several new guises, gaining control of the media, higher education, corporations, private foundations, government bureaucracy, the military, and even the churches. This is the story Hazony tells in chapter 7. Cloaking itself in the language of “’the Left,’ ‘Progressivism,’ ‘Social Justice,’ ‘Anti-Racism,’ ‘Anti-Fascism,’ ‘Black Lives Matter,’ ‘Critical Race Theory,’ ‘Identity Politics,’ ‘Political Correctness,’ ‘Wokeness,’ and more,” this “updated version of Marxism” (313) uses the abstract ideals of liberalism against liberalism itself. Because liberalism subjects all traditions to its principles of liberty and equality, and because no society ever achieves these principles perfectly, the Marxist waits in the wings ready to subject even liberalism to the withering critique of its own critical method (320-325). Thus the historic trend is for liberalism continually to yield ground to Marxism, even if the latter does not openly claim the Marxist label.

Curiously, chapter 8, in which Hazony sets forth the contours of his own conservative democracy, is the shortest in the book, at not quite sixteen pages. Yet his discussion thus far has been clear enough to indicate what he favors as an alternative to liberalism and Marxism. Hazony’s conservative democracy revolves around a distinctive national identity, an affirmation of biblical religion, the common law tradition, the importance of family and congregation, parental responsibility for education, a cautious affirmation of the market, limited immigration, a foreign policy conducive to maintaining national independence, and a refusal to yield this independence to international bodies.

As someone who enjoys getting to know new people, I was particularly enamored of the final part of the book, consisting of chapter 9 and a conclusion, in which Hazony takes an autobiographical turn, telling of his courtship of the woman who would become his wife, the founding of the alternative student periodical, The Princeton Tory, during his undergraduate studies, and the conservative renaissance at Princeton University during the 1980s. He makes a strong case for integrating one’s social and political convictions with one’s personal life, deliberately maintaining the generational bonds that hold families and congregations together.

Where Hazony is strongest is in his appreciation for the role of tradition in our lives and communities. Even if we attempt to distance ourselves from our parents, we are more like them than we are different. If we think we are offering the world something new and innovative, on further reflection we come to recognize the debt we owe our predecessors who provided us with the means for so doing. At their best, conservatives carry within themselves a pronounced gratitude for what is—something that the ostensibly more progressive ideologies, with their posture of perpetual critique, seem incapable of doing. The conservative emphasis on empiricism is less likely than a deductive rationalism to upend people’s lives and livelihoods for the sake of an overriding but untried cause.

A thorough reading of the book will provide us with nuggets of wisdom easily applicable to everyday life. I especially appreciated his treatment of loyalty and honor as binding elements in marriage and family. Hazony treats the fifth commandment of the Decalogue, to honor one’s parents, as foundational for a conservative society. Unlike the liberal worldview, which reduces obligation to individual consent, the command to honor father and mother recognizes that we have obligations based simply on our membership in and loyalty to a given community. Our birth to our parents means that, even as we grow to maturity and are no longer subject to their authority in an immediate way, we nevertheless owe them honour because of who they are relative to us.

As a retired university instructor, I was deeply moved by this insight: “there is an obligation to honor one’s mentor or teacher, which cannot be discharged simply by paying the teacher the wages that are owed to him according to his contract” (160). We undoubtedly recognize this at an intuitive level, but an ideology attempting to reduce all human relationships to mere contracts amongst individuals will try to suppress it—if carried through consistently, that is.

For all its strengths, however, I believe that Hazony’s argument falls short for two basic reasons.

First, there is a tension between his defense of conservatism against the charge that it “must be relativist and nihilist, leaving no room for truth in politics and morals” (172) and his focus on the distinctive features of Anglo-American conservatism. He believes that empiricism constitutes a third alternative to the false dichotomy of rationalism and relativism (174).

But might it be possible to use his vaunted empirical method to come to conclusions of a more general nature—something he is mostly reluctant to do? Hazony notes that, in the Anglo-American tradition, among the purposes of government are to “establish justice,” “insure domestic tranquility,” “provide for the common defense,” and “promote the general welfare.” Nevertheless, it is not clear that these tasks are peculiar to only one tradition. Do not all governments pursue these tasks in some measure? Are not all governments characterized by an ongoing effort to balance the legitimate interests within their jurisdictions and to defend against external predators? Even where a country, such as China, gets the balance egregiously wrong, as seen in Beijing’s treatment of Hong Kong and the Uyghurs, are we not justified in concluding that its government has violated, not just abstract human rights, but the fundamental principles of justice that hold for everyone? Hazony is hesitant to go this far, perhaps because such conclusions have often led to foreign interventions across the borders of sovereign nation states. Yet if a country outside the anglosphere is routinely persecuting its own people, Hazony’s method appears unable to provide us with criteria for judging that things are amiss.

Second, while the best social theories account for the genuine pluriformity of society, namely, that society is composed of a variety of social formations each having its own unique structure and task, Hazony’s understanding does not improve on the reductionism of liberalism. If anything can be said to define liberalism, it is its followers’ quest to reduce all communities to mere voluntary associations. If the state is the product of a voluntary contract amongst component individuals, and if marriage, family, and church can also be defined as such, then there is nothing unique to any of these. All are aggregations of individuals coming together for their own subjective purposes. A major reason why there is such confusion over the meaning of marriage today is that, within the predominant liberal paradigm, all social formations are products of contract, and anyone arguing for a “thicker” account, in which marriage possesses intrinsic qualities irreducible to individual wills, is likely to be treated with suspicion or worse.

True, Hazony does pay lip service to societal pluriformity, recognizing that human beings organize themselves into families, tribes, and nations. He recognizes the value of people maintaining the more proximate loyalties associated with the smaller social formations, such as “[l]ocal political chapters, churches and synagogues, schools and other community organizations” (115). Yet his understanding of the nature of such communities is remarkably undifferentiated. For Hazony, all communities are characterized by “ties of mutual loyalty,” are structured hierarchically, see competition for positions of honour within and without, and are dependent on traditional institutions for their continued existence over generations (100-101).

Yet to observe that people organize themselves into families, tribes, and nations is insufficiently empirical, glosses over centuries of historical development, and cannot do justice to the real world of life in community. In fact, of course, 21st-century people organize themselves, not into tribes, but into a variety of differentiated communities such as business enterprises, labour unions, universities, amateur and professional football clubs, mutual aid societies, artists co-operatives, charitable foundations, and so forth, in addition to those four basic institutions of marriage, family, state, and church. To observe that all of these are characterized by hierarchy, loyalty, and competition for honour is not a significant improvement over the liberal account and amounts at best to a weak defence of pluriformity. This is where Hazony’s professed conservatism, even taking into account its considerable wisdom, shows its limitations at a basic level.

Despite these flaws, I still loved the book and strongly recommend it to readers dissatisfied with the distortions of liberalism and Marxism and the ease with which the larger society has succumbed to their empty promises. If Hazony’s method is insufficiently empirical, the influence of a biblical worldview on his thinking is nevertheless unmistakable, and he therefore has much to offer the discerning reader. This is what makes the book worth reading, and we do well to reflect on its implications for our lives and for our communities.

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Posted by David Koyzis

David Koyzis is a Global Scholar with Global Scholars Canada and lives with his family in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.

20 Comments

  1. Why is a review of a book about conservatism being made here while favorable books about liberalism or Marxism seem to be absent? Why the need to so favorably associate political conservatism with Christian orthodoxy? And here we should note that because conservatism is a relative term depending on one’s geographical and/or ideological setting, a specific conservatism is being referenced: Anglo-American conservatism. And that sometimes goes by the name of traditionalism here in the states even though tradition is also a relative term for the same reasons.

    First, let’s establish one truth: there is no ideology that is omniscient. What is implied in saying thatis that each ideology is deficient in adequately addressing all situations and thus we must learn from other ideologies. Of course, ideologues from every side from libertarian to conservative to liberal to leftist strain greatly to acknowledge that fact. But my claim here is simply based on the nature of those who create and formulate our ideologies: people.

    Second, we should explore the possibility that the more of an ideologue one is, the more authoritarian they become. And when it comes to ideologies, the more authoritarian one becomes, the more one uses the ideological credentials of a given source, rather than the facts and logic employed by that source, to determine what one accepts as being true or fact. That is why conservative ideologues tend to summarily denounce Critical Theory and Critical Race Theory because of the ties that exist between those theories and Marxism. In fact, from the American conservative authoritarian’s perspective, it is necessary to summarily dismiss anything that comes from Marx lest any individual statements that one acknowledges. as true adds to Marx’s credentials. And thus the American conservative authoritarian is afraid that if Marx gets too many credentials, he must believed without question.

    Finally, the conservative-liberal-Marxist divide aside, the problem with American conservatism putting the Anglo-American conservative tradition on too high a pedestal in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment is that such an action not only implicitly promotes white supremacy, it also promotes the employment of ethnocracy over democracy. A description of what an ethnocracy and why it oppose democracy can be found on pg 74 of Jeff Halper’s book, An Israeli In Palestine: Resisting Dispossession, Redeeming Israel:


    An ethnocracy is the opposite of a democracy, although it might incorporate some elements of democracy such as universal citizenship and elections. It arises when one particular group—the Jews in Israel, the Russians in Russia, the Protestants in pre-1972 Northern Ireland, the whites in apartheid South Africa, the Shi’ite Muslims of Iran, the Malay of Malaysia and, if they had their way, the white Christian fundamentalist in the US—seizes control of the government and the armed forces in order to enforce a regime of exclusive privilege over other groups in what is in fact a multi-ethic or multi-religious society. Ethnocracy, or ethno-nationalism, privileges ethnos over demos. whereby one’s ethnic affiliation, be it defined by race, descent, religion, language or national origin, takes precedence over citizenship in determining to whom a country actually “belongs.” Israel is referred to explicitly by its political leaders as a “Jewish Democracy.”

    Reply

    1. “Finally, the conservative-liberal-Marxist divide aside, the problem with American conservatism putting the Anglo-American conservative tradition on too high a pedestal in a multicultural, multi-ethnic environment is that such an action not only implicitly promotes white supremacy, it also promotes the employment of ethnocracy over democracy.”

      Total non sequitur. The Anglo-American conservative tradition was formulated in opposition to continental thought (first the French Revolution, later Marxism), and the French, Germans, etc. are equally white. Racialism plays no part in the tradition.

      Reply

      1. It’s true that English Toryism developed in reaction to events in continental Europe. But that’s not at all true of American conservatism. American conservatism has always rejected the kind of crown-and-church notion of conservatism in favor of a liberal conservatism grounded in the natural rights of the individual.

        Further, to the extent that there ever was a unifying religious tradition in America, that tradition was that of a nominal mainline Protestantism. But most of those seeking to revive this alleged traditional role of religion are practitioners of forms of Christianity that have nearly always been marginal in American life: Catholicism and hayseed Protestantism (fundamentalism and evangelicalism).

        In this case, Hazony has fabricated a tradition that never actually existed. It’s functions as a kind of white origin myth not too different from the thesis put forth in The Birth if a Nation (sans anti-Catholic sentiment).

        Reply

      2. CPT,
        The Anglo-American Tradition cannot be reduced to a reaction to the French Revolution. It includes ideas and documents from England some of which predates the first English settlements in America.

        Conservatives draw heavily on that Anglo-American Tradition. The current divide then relies on situations and events that have occurred after the French Revolution.

        Racism very much plays into part of the Anglo-American tradition. As Cheryl Harris noted, from the beginning, race and property were very much bound together. Race was a justification for taking land from Native Americans. And blacks were the only race here that could be classified as property itself. Part of that tradition, which is basically an Anglophile one, has racism written into England treatment of its colonies. The English, feeling entitled by a belief in their own superiority, colonized other lands where people of color lived. Take India for example, the British assumed the right to rule over India. There might have been equality in England proper, but not in its colonies.

        Also, you seem to write as if Anglo-American tradition has everything to teach those from the French Revolution and Marx. Again, that is part of the assumption of superiority. Only this time, race is not a factor.

        Reply

        1. Bias and mistreatment based on ancestry and/or inherited group characteristics (racism, ethnic prejudice, tribalism, caste systems, etc.) are universal. Learn history and travel the world and you’ll see that. You can identify it in any society, as it’s an effect of sin, so it no more discredits the Anglo-American traditions than it discredits the Confucianist tradition.

          And while I certainly think Marx is worth studying – I have studied him, and think he had some real philosophical insights for his day and age – I feel zero reservations about claiming that the overall impact of Anglo-American traditions has been more laudable than that of Marx or Robespierre. England and the USA have actually possessed the theological/philosophical resources within their traditions to reform from within and stop the worst misdeeds committed by the societies (slavery, segregation, etc.). While we should always be reforming, it’s daft for any Christian to say that movements that are avowedly atheist and want to exterminate the Church are just as good or better as the tradition described by Hazony.

          Reply

          1. Your first statement proves my point. It shows that Anglo-American tradition is not special and thus it doesn’t deserve the high pedestal on which some want to place it.

            As for Marx, we need to remember that no ideology is omniscient and thus we need a hybrid of the best ideologies and traditions available. One of the best reviews of Marx was written by Martin Luther King Jr. He agreed with William Temple that Marxism was a Christian Heresy. For MLK saw things in Marx that Christians must include in their thinking while other things could never be included. He said while mistakenly conflating Soviet Union “Communism” with Marxism. If we read Marx close enough, the overthrow of the Bourgeoisie was to be done by the proletariat, not by ‘opportunistic vanguards,’ as Chomsky called Lenin and the Bolsheviks and that description fits others. In fact, Lenin was from the petite bourgeoisie class and, for the most part, Stalin was a thug who had gone to seminary.

            Your comparison of Anglo-America tradition to Marx is both questionable and problematic. It is questionable because it ignores the horrors and atrocities that came with the Anglo-American tradition. It is problematic because such a claim highlights one of the key faults of that tradition: the insistence on being superior to others. That is tribalism and neither the Anglo-American tradition nor Marxism are good enough to merit tribal loyalties.

          2. Curt,

            Yeah, let’s compare the atrocities of the Anglo-American conservative tradition to those of Marxism. How many died or were killed off under the Soviets’ Marxist rule? How many have died or were killed off under Chinese Marxist rule? What about Pol Pot? What about the Kim dynasty in North Korea?

            The Anglo-American conservative tradition isn’t spotless by any means. But its legacy of atrocities can’t hold a candle to the atrocities perpetrated by Marxist regimes.

            Besides, if the US is such a terrible place, pack your bags and move to the Marxist paradise of Venezuela.

          3. Ryo,
            If you want to compare atrocities, and I would argue that it is more difficult than you realize, then you have to measure in percentages rather that raw numbers simply because percentages better tell us what a group would do had it had the opportunity.

            In addition, if you want to compare atrocities, then you should compare atrocities performed at home and those performed outside one’s borders.

            But what makes comparing the two problematic is in determining what nations were really Marxist. For example consider the following distinction made between Leninism and Marxism:

            https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WsC0q3CO6lM

    2. Hi Curt.

      I think it’s also important to distinguish between small-c conservatism (which has always been the predominant strain in America) and big-c Conservatism (of the crown-and-church variety that predominated in Europe).

      The former has always embraced liberalism. That’s evident in our country’s founding documents. This small-c conservatism is more of a posture than a political ideology. Its chief attribute is gratitude for what has preceded us and for the immense benefits we enjoy as people blessed enough to have been born in this fair land.

      The latter is utterly foreign to America. It reflects a spirit of resentment and entitlement rather than one of gratitude. It’s a political ideology that rejects natural rights of the individual and instead reduces individuals to their ethnic-religious identities. It’s just Robin D’Angelo for white Christians. Yes, our society has at times erred in this direction. But, when we have, it’s always been seen as an aberration from our founding principles and not as a “tradition” to be preserved.

      Reply

      1. Ryo,
        Cannot agree with you here. It seems that your view is made based on assumptions made on the beliefs of the founding fathers who met in the Constitutional Convention to write The Constitution. And no, we cannot divorce the Anglo part from the American part of the tradition. That tradition goes back to the Magna Carta and includes English Common Law.

        In addition, when we read about how settlers initially got along with each other, liberalism is the last term that would come to mind. In fact, the writers of The Constitution were responding to Shays Rebellion and nationwide dissent to the economic conditions of the time. The purpose of writing The Constitution was to create a stronger federal gov’t that could better respond to future insurrections like Shays Rebellion.

        Reply

        1. Shays Rebellion certainly played some role in our abandonment of the Articles. But that hardly proves that those who participated in the drafting of the Constitution weren’t liberals. To suggest that they were trying to re-establish a kind of crown-and-church authoritarian order is flatly contradicted by the historical record. Besides, the federal government was a relatively weak government of limited powers until the 20th century.

          Reply

          1. Ryo,
            The notes on the Constitutional Conventions along with its historical context show that, for the most part, the participants were interested in maintaining the status quo for America’s elites. Elites who supported the Federalist approach as described in the Federalist papers were not shy in playing politics by using labels pejoratively to try to control public perception of alternative views.

          2. That specious theory has been debunked countless times. Besides, most of the rights that secured elite status were rights that elites had under state law. The federal government was relatively weak until the rise of the administrative state in the 20th century.

          3. Ryo,
            It is not a specious theory, again, one only needs to read the documents such as both Yates’s and Madison’s notes on the Constitutional Convention as well as the Federalist Papers.

    3. “Why is a review of a book about conservatism being made here while favorable books about liberalism or Marxism seem to be absent?”

      I would have thought the answer to that is simple enough — much of the leadership and readership of MereOrthodoxy is sympathetic to conservativism (even nationalist conservativism), dismissive of Marxism, and increasingly skeptical of liberalism.

      “Why the need to so favorably associate political conservatism with Christian orthodoxy?”

      I’d wager that’s because much of the leadership and readership of MereOrthodoxy is politically conservative, perceive political conservativism as under attack, and wish to rescue it. One way to rescue it is to baptize it in the language of Christian orthodoxy.

      Reply

      1. Gavoker,
        And that is my point. In fact, what religiously conservative Christian leaders do not promote some significant degree of conservatism? That is the problem.

        Reply

  2. Hazony appears to miss the boat in several important respects concerning this Anglo-American conservatism.

    First, American conservatism has always been quite distinct from English Toryism. Hazony lumps them together and effectively writes the American variant out of history to be replaced by a Toryism that American conservatives generally opposed.

    Second, the focus on individual rights in the American conservative tradition is not some invention of the 1960s. No. The notion that individuals possess certain natural rights that precede government is written in the Declaration of Independence and is reflected in the Preamble of the Constitution.

    Third, as Mark Noll has documented well, America has only ever been Christian in a very nominal sense. Nearly all of the men who attended the Constitutional convention were heterodox Christians whose religion was closer to Deism than to orthodox Christianity. When church attendance was at its highest—in the 1950s—most people attended mainline Protestant churches that rarely preached anything resembling a gospel message. This kind of nominal Christianity has largely faded from the culture today. Most orthodox Christians would say that that’s a good thing.

    Fourth, history doesn’t bear out Hazony’s notion of an America with a tight sense of national identity. The notion of whiteness, for example, didn’t emerge until after WWII. My mom’s family, for example, didn’t start speaking English at home until my grandparents were kids. In fact, my grandparents both did the first six grades of schooling in German.

    In short, Hazony seems to long for a kind conservatism and tight national identity that one may find among conservatives in France. But America is not France.

    Reply

  3. Outstanding article. Enjoyed Koyzis’ referenced book a couple years ago. Thank you.

    Reply

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